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COMMENT
DRAWING THE LINE ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM: REJECTING AN
ACADEMIC PEER-REVIEW PRIVILEGE FOR TENURE
COMMITTEE DELIBERATIONS
Rollins v. Farris, 108 F.R.D. 714 (E.D. Ark. 1985)
In Rollins v. Farris,1 the District Court for the Eastern District of Ar-
kansas refused to recognize an academic peer-review privilege for tenure-
review bodies in employment discrimination cases.
The University of Central Arkansas denied tenure to Dr. Nanette Rol-
lins, who had served as an assistant professor at that university for six
years.2 Rollins filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (E.E.O.C.) claiming sex, race and age discrimination.3 On
deposition, a tenure committee member refused to answer questions con-
cerning statements made in the course of committee deliberations, insist-
ing that the statements were privileged in the name of "academic
freedom."' Rollins then moved to compel discovery of the statements
and the district court held: Tenure-review materials are discoverable in
employment discrimination suits only if intent is an element of the claim
or necessary to rebut proof offered by the defendant.5
Courts have long recognized the concept of academic freedom as a
limit on state control of educators and educational institutions.6 The
1. 108 F.R.D. 714 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
2. Id. at 715. Rollins became eligible for tenure in January, 1984, and the University denied
her request for tenure on July 3, 1984. IM
3. Id. Rollins asserted claims based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 2000e (1985) and 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b)(1985). She sought an injunction directing the tenure committee to grant her tenure request,
an injunction against further violations, costs and attorney's fees. Id. Dr. James Rollins, the plain-
tiff's spouse, joined in the action, claiming that he had suffered severe reductions in his teaching
schedule in retaliation for statements he had made. Id. He asserted that the university's actions
constituted retaliatory discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1985) and the first amendment. Id
4. 108 F.R.D. at 715. During the desposition the committee member was asked to identify the
areas of Rollins's tenure application that committee members had commented negatively upon. Id.
The committee member asserted that tenure-committee minutes had precipitated the discussion.
5. Id. at 719.
6. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (affirming university's
freedom to make its own decisions); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 US. 234 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (identifying four types of institutional academic freedom: "to determine . . .on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.").
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preservation of academic freedom furthers society's interest in the uncen-
sored development and availability of ideas.7 The Supreme Court has
identified academic freedom as an individual right arising from the pe-
riphery of the first amendment,' but the scope of academic freedom as
applied to institutions remains undefined.
The academic peer-review privilege combines the concepts of academic
freedom and common-law privilege as codified in rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.9 Although common-law courts tended to restrict the
scope of existing privileges and disfavor the creation of new ones,"t rule
501 permits case-by-case consideration of "novel" privileges." Even
under rule 501, however, courts only reluctantly recognize new privileges
because such privileges may frustrate the search for "every man's
evidence."12
Opponents of the academic peer-review privilege argue that such a
privilege is antithetical to the notion of academic freedom because it per-
mits tenure committees, without fear of exposure, to deny tenure to per-
7. See Comment, An Academic Freedom Privilege in the Peer Context: In Re Dinnan and
Gray v. Board of Higher Education, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 286, 288-93 (1983). See also ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFES-
soRs, 33, 34 (L. Joughin ed. 1967) (Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure of
American Association of University Professors)(recognizing academic freedom as encompassing free-
dom in research, publication and classroom discussion).
8. See, eg., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)("special concern of the
First Amendment"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965)(describing individual
academic freedom as a "peripheral" and "penumbral" right). But see Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109 (1959)(does not apply to non-academic activities).
Commentators have disagreed about whether academic freedom is recognized as a constitutional
right. Compare Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1065
(1968) (questioning existence of academic freedom as a constitutional right) with Note, Civil
Rights--Academic Freedom, Secrecy and Subjectivity as Obstacles to Proving a Title VII Sex Discrim-
ination Suit in Academia, 60 N.C.L. REV. 438, 446 (1982) (suggesting that academic freedom has
attained the status of a constitutional right).
9. FED. R. EVID. 501 provides that "the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts ... ".
10. See Developments in the Law.- Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1450, 1472
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Privileged Communications]. See also 8 WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE
§ 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Dean Wigmore identified four characteristics necessary to estab-
lish a communication as privileged: (I) a confidence that communications will remain undisclosed,
(2) a relationship in which confidentiality is essential, (3) a relationship the community seeks to
foster, and (4) the injury to the relationship by disclosure is greater than the benefit derived by
correct disposal of the litigation. Id.
11. See, eg., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47-48 (1980).
12. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (noting that privileges should not be
created lightly as they are "in derogation of the search for truth.").
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sons espousing unpopular or unconventional views. 13 Proponents of an
academic peer-review privilege fear that disclosure of internal communi-
cations would chill the free exchange of opinions during tenure commit-
tee deliberations and thereby inhibit effective and independent
institutional decisionmaking. 14  Federal courts have disagreed on the
question of whether academic freedom creates a privilege that bars dis-
covery of tenure-committee deliberations in employment discrimination
cases.
15
In Keyes v. Lenois Rhyne College, 6 the Fourth Circuit recognized a
qualified peer-review privilege that applies only if the contents of the ten-
ure-committee records are not at issue. 17 Under this approach, also
adopted by the Ninth Circuit,18 a court must first determine whether an
institution has denied tenure on the basis of information contained in
tenure-committee files. If these files contain the information upon which
tenure denial is based, the institution cannot shield the files from discov-
ery by claiming privilege.19 If however, the institution does not rely
upon peer-review materials to justify its denial of tenure, the records are
privileged.20
13. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 344. See also Gray v. Board of Higher Education, 692
F.2d 901, 909 (2d Cir. 1982) (academic peer-review privilege may create a veil for censors).
14. See Privileged Communications, supra note 10, at 1612. See also Murphy, Preventing Un-
necessary Intrusions on University Autonomy: A Proposed Academic Freedom Privilege, 69 CALIF. L.
REv. 1538, 1542 (1981). But see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72 (E.
Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (questioning whether there would be any ebb in information if privileges were
absent).
15. See infra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.
16. 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977).
17. Id. at 581. The plaintiff brought a Title VII action claiming sex and age discrimination. Id.
at 579.
18. See Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (dictum), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982).
19. 552 F.2d at 581. The Fourth Circuit stated that "if the College had sought to justify any
male-female disparity on the basis of [faculty] evaluations, the plaintiff should have been granted the
opportunity to use them .. " Id..
20. Id. The College did not claim, however, that faculty evaluations justified disparate treat-
ment of males and females with respect to permission to teach beyond retirement age. Rather, the
statistics did not evidence any such disparity. Id. at 580 n.3.
In Lynn, 656 F.2d at 1347, the Ninth Circuit asserted that the University's denial of tenure based
on the plaintiff's ability necessarily implicated the peer evaluations contained in the tenure files. In
addition, because the University systematically released summaries of such information to personnel
requesting the information, the court found that the University possessed far less interest in confi-
dentiality than in the ordinary case. Although the court expressly adopted the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning in Keyes, it did not need to reach that issue because the initial balancing process weighed
in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at 1347-48.
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The Seventh Circuit, in EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac,21
adopted a slightly different version of this qualified peer-review privilege.
Balancing the plaintiff's need for information against the review commit-
tee's need to preserve confidentially, the court allowed the EEOC limited
discovery of peer evaluations that formed the basis of the university's
decision.22 The court refused to permit discovery of the identities of the
committee members23 and indicated that further discovery would be au-
thorized only if the plaintiff showed "particularized need" rising above
mere relevance.24
In Gray v. Board of Higher Education,25 the defendant institution of-
fered no explanation for its denial of tenure.26 The Second Circuit never-
theless balanced the interests of the respective parties to determine
whether the records were discoverable' T. Because the plaintiff had to
prove intent to establish a prima facie case, the court in Gray found the
plaintiff's need for the disclosure of the tenure materials "transparently
evident"28 and easily struck the balance in favor of discovery.29
Although the Second Circuit purported to apply a balancing test rather
than a rule of privilege,3" its analysis closely resembled that of circuits
recognizing a qualified privilege.31
A Fifth Circuit decision, In re Dinnan,32 expressly rejected the aca-
demic peer-review privilege. The court stated that the discovery of ten-
ure-committee deliberations poses an evidentiary, not an academic-
21. 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
22. Id. at 337-38.
23. Id. The court recognized the institution's need to keep the identities of the peer evaluators
confidential in order to insure "candid and frank evaluations." Id. at 336.
24. Id. at 338. The court defined "particularized need" as a "compelling necessity for the spe-
cific information requested." Id. The court borrowed the particularized need test from cases where a
party seeks disclosure of grand jury material. Id.
25. 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
26. Id. at 903.
27. Id. at 905. The court approved the balancing approach adopted by the district court, but
struck a different balance.
28. Id. at 905-06. Gray brought his action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1985). In
addition, Gray asserted a fourteenth amendment claim that his civil rights were violated. The court
observed that intent is an element of both claims, 692 F.2d at 905, and noted that the plaintiff must
initially establish a prima facie case of discrimination, id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
29. 692 F.2d at 905. Gray sought to discover the votes of two committee members he claimed
had discriminated against him. Id.
30. Id. at 904.
31. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
32. 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Dinnan v. Blaubergs, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
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freedom question.33 The court reasoned that the extension of privileged
status to tenure deliberations would threaten, rather than foster, aca-
demic freedom.34 The court concluded that permitting the discovery of
tenure-committee deliberations would benefit institutions by encouraging
responsible decisionmaking. 35
The Third Circuit, in EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College,3 6 also
rejected a claim of academic peer-review privilege. The court noted that
such a privilege would frustrate a major purpose of Title VII, the eradi-
cation of employment discrimination in academic institutions.37 The
court recognized the safeguards provided in rule 26 of the Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure38 as adequate protection against unnecessary interfer-
ence with institutional decisionmaking. 39 Finally, the Third Circuit
noted the Supreme Court's approval of extensive discovery in Title VII
discrimination cases.'
In Rollins v. Farris,4" the District Court for the Eastern District of
33. Id. at 427. In determining whether discovery can be had under rules of evidence, courts
balance the relevancy of the disclosure to the case against the potential harm resulting from the
disclosure. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 10, at § 2285. See also Comment, supra note 7, at 323 n.
206 (noting that this balance is less demanding than one involving the social importance of a
privilege).
34. 661 F.2d at 430. The court noted that a university could use tenure denial to suppress
ideas, the very danger that the Supreme Court sought to avoid in upholding academic freedom. Id.
Noting that Justice Frankfurter's four essential freedoms, see supra note 6, applied only to decisions
made on academic grounds, the court reasoned that denial of tenure on non-academic grounds goes
beyond the protection of academic freedom. Id. at 431.
35. Id. at 432. The court stated that the only harm to the process is that those individuals
unwilling to explain their actions will choose not to serve, which is no harm at all. Id.
36. 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985).
37. Id. at 114.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 provides:
(b) ... (1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ...
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision (a) shall be
limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or is obtainable from source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expen-
sive ... or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of
the case ... and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its
own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c). ...
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a pary or by the person from whom discovery is
sought ... the court ... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense....
39. 775 F.2d at 115.
40. Id. at 116. The court cited EEOC v. Shell Oil Co. 466 U.S. 54 (1984) (Congress implicitly
endorsed broad discovery of relevant material in Title VII cases).
41. 108 F.R.D. 714 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
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Arkansas surveyed the treatment by other circuits of a claim of academic
peer-review privilege and adopted the Third Circuit's Franklin & Mar-
shall holding.42 The court first determined that a qualified privilege was
unnecessary because established rules of discovery adequately protect ac-
ademic freedom.43 The court found rule 26, which requires material
sought for discovery to be "relevant to the subject matter involved" and
gives courts the authority to prevent abuses and issue protective orders, 4
sufficient to safeguard institutional interests.45
The Rollins court found the tenure-committee deliberations relevant
and, therefore, discoverable under rule 26.46 The court proceeded, how-
ever, to limit discovery to actions in which "proof of intent to discrimi-
nate is necessary to establish an element of the claim or to rebut proof
offered by the defendant." 47 The court emphasized that materials cannot
be discovered when the tenure committee bases its decision on criteria
not contained in tenure-committee files. 48 Finally, the court noted the
Supreme Court's policy of permitting extensive discovery when proof of
intent is required.49
The Rollins court correctly held that an academic peer-review privi-
lege is unnecessary in light of the limitations imposed by rule 26. The
adoption of a peer-review privilege would inevitably burden the truth-
seeking process and hamper the effectiveness of the judicial system. 50
Such a privilege would add to the inherent difficulty of proving employ-
ment-discrimination claims and render courts virtually impotent in en-
42. Id. at 720.
43. Id.
44. See text of Rule 26, supra note 38.
45. 108 F.R.D. at 720.
46. Id. at 719. The court stated that the plaintiffs "are entitled to know what matters were
considered and are entitled to ascertain the reasons for the action taken in order to prove their case."
Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The court noted that a plaintiff does not have "carte blanche authority to discover secret
discussions merely by alleging an employment discrimination." Id. Discovery is allowed only if the
plaintiff alleges that the tenure committee "harbors a discriminatory animus ... [that] would be
reflected in the notes of the deliberations or votes taken ... [or] that the tenure denial was based on
evaluations of a plaintiff's performance discussed at the tenure committee meetings ... ." Id. If,
however, allegations resulting in tenure denial can be shown to be "pretextual in nature," reference
to committee reports need not be necessary. Id.
49. Id. at 718 (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)).
50. See supra note 12.
[Vol. 64:1271
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forcing anti-discrimination legislation."1 An academic peer-review
privilege would thus thwart Congress' desire to eliminate employment
discrimination in academia.52
The Rollins court also recognized the possibility that an academic
peer-review privilege may erode rather than ensure academic freedom.53
The court correctly observed that academic freedom has little value if
discriminatory tenure decisions can be shielded from inquiry. The Fifth
Circuit's statement in Dinnan, suggesting that the peer-review process
can do without those who refuse to account for their decisions,54 strikes
at the heart of the issue.55 Privileges exist to protect confidentiality in
relationships that society values above its search for truth. Privileges
should not be perverted to protect decisions which run counter to ex-
pressed societal goals or values.56 The Rollins court appropriately recog-
nized that an academic peer-review privilege is antithetical to academic
freedom and the eradication of employment discrimination in academic
institutions.
Although the Rollins court correctly rejected an academic peer-review
privilege, it failed to identify precisely the authority for its holding. The
court claimed to adopt the Third Circuit's Franklin & Marshall hold-
ing,57 but in fact its reasoning mingles aspects of the approaches taken by
several circuits. By limiting discovery to situations in which the institu-
tion bases its decision on peer-review materials5", the court went beyond
the Third Circuit's reliance on rule 26.19 In adopting language similar to
that of courts recognizing a qualified privilege,' the Rollins court sug-
51. See Privileged Communications, supra note 10, at 1628 (privilege would create an insur-
mountable barrier to proving discrimination).
52. See Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 550 (3d Cir. 1980)("the legislative his-
tory of Title VII is unmistakable as to the legislative intent to subject academic institutions to its
requirements."); EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1985)(citing
Kunda).
53. See Gray, 692 F.2d at 909 (privilege can operate as "a veil for censors"); In re Dinnan, 661
F.2d at 430 (could serve as a "double edged sword" threatening the values it protects); Comment,
supra note 7, at 344 (privilege would "fail to afford protection where it is needed most").
54. See In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 432.
55. Privileged Communications, supra note 10, at 1627.
56. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 10, at § 2285.
57. 108 F.R.D. at 720.
58. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
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gested that, despite semantic differences, similar results would follow
from each of the differing approaches.
JA.P.
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